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Recent Developments
United States v. Alvarez-Machain:
THE UNITEDSTATES GOVERNMENT MAY ABDUCT FOREIGN
CITIZENS FROM FOREIGN TERRITORY UNLESS EXPRESSLY
FORBIDDEN BY AN EXTRADITION TREATY.
In United States v. AlvarezMachain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992), the
United States Supreme Court held that
the U.S. government may forciblyabduct a foreign national to bring that
person to trial for alleged violations of
federal criminal law. The Court stated
that an extradition treaty between the
United States and a foreign nation creates a mechanism to deliver criminal
suspects, but does not limit the
government's options unless expressly
stated in the treaty. As such, a forcible
abduction to gain jurisdiction over a
foreign national does not create a jurisdictional defense in a United States
District Court.
In the late 1980s, Enrique Camarena,
a special agent for the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), was
kidnapped and murdered while investigating drug trafficking through
Mexico. An autopsy revealed that he
had been severely tortured before dying. The DEA believed that Humberto
Alvarez-Machain ("Alvarez"), aMexican doctor, intentionally prolonged
Camarena's life to allow further torture and interrogation. A federal indictment was issued for Alvarez's ar-

rest.
After DEA officials unsuccessfully
attempted to gain custody of Alvarez

through informal negotiations with
Mexican officials, the DEA offered a
reward plus expenses to the person
who delivered Alvarez to the United
States. On April 2, 1990 DEA officials
arrested Alvarez after he had been forcibly kidnapped in Guadalajara, Mexico
and flown in a private plane to El Paso,
Texas. Though they were not personally involved, DEA agents were responsible for the kidnapping.
In the United States District Court
for the Central District of California,
Alvarez moved for dismissal claiming
that the court lacked jurisdiction. His
claim was based on alleged violations
of the Extradition Treaty ('"Treaty")
between the United States and Mexico.
After concluding that Alvarez's abduction did violate the Treaty, the district court ordered that Alvarez be repatriated to Mexico. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the lower court and concluded
that the government-backed abduction,
combined with the official Mexican
protests, violated the ''pwpose'' of the
Treaty.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the United States principally argued that the forcible, international abduction did not bar the district
court's jurisdiction because such action failed to invoke the treaty. Id. at
2193. Alvarez, on the other hand,
contended that the Treaty applied and
that its implied terms established extradition as the exclusive means forthe
United States to gain custody of a
person located on Mexican soil. Id.

Even though it had not previously
addressed this precise issue, the Court
noted that it had separately addressed
two key sub-issues in cases involving
alleged violations of the extradition
treaties andjurisdictional claims based
on forcible abductions. The Court,
after reviewing the relevant case law,
embraced the government's argument
that the key issue was whether the
Treaty had been invoked. Id. If the
Treaty was not invoked, then the "forcible abduction [was] no sufficient reason why the party [Alvarez] should not
answer" for the offense. Id. (quoting
Ker v. Rlinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886».
If the Treaty was invoked, then the
Court would determine whether the
abduction violated the Treaty. However, notwithstanding the factual basis
of Ker, the Court simplified the issue
by ruling that governmental involvement in the abduction was irrelevant.
Id at 2192 n.7.
The Court found that the Treaty
neither directed the parties to refrain
from forcible abductions, nor explained
the consequences if either party took
such action. Id. at 2193. Alvarez
argued that Articles 22(1) and (9) established that the Treaty was meant to
prohibit forcible international abductions. Id. Article 22( 1) stated that the
Treaty shall apply to certain crimes
(including murder) whether the crime
occurred before or after the enactment
of the Treaty. Alvarez argued that this
section made application ofthe Treaty
compulsory forthe listed crimes. Id. at
2194. Nevertheless, the Court inter-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 23.1 I The Law Forum

15

preted the section as simply denoting
that the Treaty related back to crimes
which occurred before the Treaty was
ratified. Id.
Next the Court determined that section 9 of the Treaty "provide[d] a
mechanism [for extradition] which
would not otherwise exist," but did not
represent the only mechanism for gaining custody. Id. at 2193-94. Article 9
provided that afterreceiving an official
request for extradition, a nation could
either extradite the requested person or
prosecute the person on its own. Id. at
2194. Thus, Alvarez contended, Article 9 specified the only manner in
which a nation could gain custody over
an individual on foreign soil. He asserted that the restrictions and procedures established by the Treaty became superfluous if either nation was
allowed to circumvent the Treaty
through forcible abductions. Id. The
Court bolstered its position, however,
by noting that Mexico had actual notice of the Ker doctrine and the
doctrine's applicability to the Treaty.
Id.
Finally, the Court rQled that the
general international law's prohibition
of forcible abductions did not have
effect under the Treaty, nor required
that a similar prohibition be implied
into the Treaty. Id. at 2194. Alvarez
recognized that under the Treaty, the
rights of the abducted individual were
a derivative of the rights of the allegedly aggrieved nation. As such, once
that nation protested the abduction, the
nation's rights under the Treaty were
traDsformed into the individual's rights
under the international law. Alvarez
concluded that because both the abduction violated his individual rights
and Mexico filed a protest, the Treaty
must be enforced on his behalf to bar
the in personam jurisdiction of the
United States District Court. Id. at
2195. The Court rejected this theory
fortwo reasons. First, the Court opined
that such rigid enforcement produced
unjust results if one nation acted offensively toward the other. Id. Second,
the Court pronounced that only the law
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between nations specifically applied to
extradition treaties should be considered, not the full body of the general
international law. Id.
A lengthy dissent written by Justice
Stevens and joined by Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor condemned
the majority ruling fortuming the terms
of the Treaty into little more than verbiage. The dissent accused the Court's
entire opinion ofbeing critically flawed
because it failed to differentiate between private conduct and governmental action. Id at 2203. The dissent
concluded that the abduction was expressly sanctioned by the Executive
Branch and was therefore constituted a
flagrant breach of the Treaty. Id.
Thus, the majority ofthe Supreme
Court, in U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, held
that the U.S. government may solicit
the forcible abduction of a foreign national in order to obtain jurisdiction
over that person. In so doing, the Court
established the rule that the existence
of an extradition treaty between the
nations is consequential only if the
treaty is invoked. This decision may
seriously affect the United States's future efforts to initiate joint actions with
foreign nations who are already leery
of the United States. After this case
was decided, Mexico promptly ceased
all joint actions with the DEA and also
began the process ofre-evaluating the
Treaty. However, it is likely that the
Court sought to make the "right" decision under the circumstances in order
to allow the courts to decide the innocence, or guilt, of an alleged villain.
By adopting the approach that an extradition treaty must be invoked to
have affect, the Court eliminated treatybased jurisdictional challenges to international abductions and granted the
United States a free hand to grab suspected criminals and bring them to
trial.
- Brett R. Wilson

MVA v. Chamberlain: DRUNKDRIV-

ERS NEED NOT BE INFORMED
OF ALLDISPARITIESBETWEEN
SANCTIONS FOR FAILING A
CHEMICAL ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION TEST AND REFUSING TO TAKE SUCH A TEST
ALTOGETHER.
In a unanimous decision interpreting sections of Maryland's transportation statutes relating to drunk driving,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
MVA v. Chamberlain, 326 Md. 296,
604 A.2d 919 (1992), ruled that a police officer is not required to inform an
intoxicated motorist of all potential
differences in penalties between refusing and failing a chemical alcohol concentration test. In so holding, the Court
declined to recognize additional procedural protection for motorists who
decline to submit to a blood alcohol
test.
The defendant Chamberlain was
stopped by a police officer for speeding and suspicion of driving while
intoxicated Afterthe officerpenormed
some field sobriety tests on Chamberlain, the officer placed Chamberlain
under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Then, quoting section 16-205.1
of the Transportation Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code, the officer
informed Chamberlain of his rights
pertaining to taking a chemical test to
determine his blood alcohol level.
The officer told Chamberlain of his
right to refuse to submit to the test but
warned that a refusal would result in an
administrative suspension ofhis Maryland driver's license. Additionally, the
officer stipulated that "[s]uspension by
the Motor Vehicle Administration shall
be 120 days for a first offense and one
year for a second or subsequent offense." Chamberlain, 326 Md. at 310,
604 A.2d at 921 (quoting Md. Trans.
Code Ann. § 16-205. 1(b) (1987».
Chamberlain was also told of the
consequences offailing to take the test.
The officer, quoting from an advice of
rights form, warned Chamberlain that
if he submitted to the test, and the
results indicated an alcohol concentra-
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